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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RUBY W. HICKEN, THOMAS F. HICKEN and ; 
JOHN T. HICKEN, ; 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ] 
vs. ] 
NORTH DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, ; 
CLAYTON GARDNER and ROBERT ] 
GAPPMAYER, ] 
Defendants/Appellees. ] 
) Case No. 960360-CA 
I Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
NORTH DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY 
Defendants-appellees, North Ditch Irrigation Company, Clayton Gardner and Robert 
Gappmayer (collectively "North Ditch") respectfully submit this Brief of Appellees. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal by plaintiffs-appellants Ruby 
W. Hicken, Thomas F. Hicken and John T. Hicken (collectively the "Hickens") pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
One issue is presented for review on this appeal: 
Did the district court properly dismiss the Hickens' complaint because the 
Hickens' claim for a continuous diversion of water from a stream is precluded by the doctrine 
219X113070 2 
of res judicata under a 1960 judgment and decree that allowed the Hickens' predecessor only 
to divert intermittently water from the stream? 
The District Court's dismissal is subject to a correction of error standard. See 
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hansen v. 
Department of Fin. Insts.. 858 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (applying correction of 
error standard to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The issue here can be decided without resorting to any statute or regulation. 
To the extent such authority may be determinative, the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -
24 (1989 & Supp. 1996) is set forth in the addendum to the Hickens' opening brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal involves the Hickens' claim to a continuous diversion of water 
from a stream. The district court rules that the Hickens' claim is barred because it was 
already the subject of a judgment and decree ("I960 Judgment") entered by Judge Joseph E. 
Nelson 36 years ago. By diverting water from the stream at any time and in any desired 
quantity, the Hickens' predecessor disrupted North Ditch's distribution of water from the 
stream to its shareholders. The 1960 Judgment restricted the Hickens' predecessor to divert 
intermittently one-half of the flow of water from the stream for a period of two hours every 
ten days. The Hickens now claim that they are not subject to the 1960 Judgment and may 
divert continuously from the stream every day to water livestock. 
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B. Course of Proceedings. 
On June 24, 1960, North Ditch Irrigation Company filed a complaint against 
Marvie Wall, the Hickens' predecessor in interest. (R. 20, 63.) An order to show cause and 
restraining order were entered against Wall. (R. 59.) On July 8, 1960, the court conducted a 
hearing on the orders. (R. 57.) On July 14, 1960, Judge Joseph E. Nelson entered findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and the 1960 Judgment. (R. 55.) No appeal was taken. 
On August 31, 1994, the Hickens filed a verified complaint against North Ditch 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County. (R. 21.) The Hickens simultaneously 
filed motions for preliminary injunction (R. 36) and temporary restraining order with notice 
(R. 25). No hearing was conducted on these motions. In April 1995, North Ditch moved to 
dismiss the Hickens' complaint (R. 44) and for expedited disposition (R. 46). 
The court granted North Ditch expedited disposition (R. 78.), and on June 9, 
1995, the court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. (R. 121.) On June 13, 1995, 
the court granted North Ditch's motion to dismiss. (R. 124.) After considering the Hickens' 
objections to the proposed orders (R. 128, 145, 157) and North Ditch's responses, (R. 153, 
162) the court entered a final order on March 14, 1996 (R. 164, 166), from which the 
Hickens now appeal. (R. 170.) 
C. Disposition of the District Court. 
On June 13, 1995, the court ruled that the Hickens' claim to divert 
continuously for watering livestock was barred under the doctrine of res judicata and granted 
North Ditch's motion to dismiss. (R. 124.) The court entered an order dismissing with 
prejudice the causes of action set forth in the Hickens' verified complaint. (R. 166.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. 1960 Judgment. 
This case involves a dispute over the diversion of water from a stream called 
"Spring Creek" located in Wallsburg, Wasatch County, Utah. Over three decades ago, the 
Hickens' predecessor, Marvie Wall (R. 20), claimed he could divert from Spring Creek any 
quantity of water, any time he wanted, sufficient for his needs. (R. 56, 59.) Wall's 
diversions significantly disrupted North Ditch's distribution of Spring Creek water to its 
stockholders. (R. 56.) 
Wall's diversions from Spring Creek forced North Ditch to file a lawsuit in 
1960 (R. 63), and the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County issued an order to 
show cause and restraining order against Wall (R. 59). The court determined that unless a 
restraining order was issued immediately, without notice, Wall would use Spring Creek water 
"any time he wants for as long as he wants,'" and as such, the shareholders of North Ditch 
"will suffer immediate and irreparable damage to their crops." (R. 59.) 
On July 8, 1960, Judge Nelson conducted a hearing on the order to show cause. 
(R. 57.) Both North Ditch and Wall were represented by counsel. (R. 57.) Judge Nelson 
heard testimony and a stipulation entered into orally before the Court by the parties. (R. 57.) 
The parties submitted the matter to Judge Nelson for decision. (R. 57.) 
On July 14, 1960, Judge Nelson made the following findings of fact: 
1. [North Ditch] has appropriated two-thirds of the flow of Spring Creek, 
said Spring Creek being located in Wallsburg, Wasatch County, State of Utah. 
2. [Wall] and his predecessors in interest have used since before 1900 
water out of said Spring Creek in the amounts they thought necessary and at 
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the times they desired to irrigate lawn, garden and pasture on the premises 
presently occupied by the defendant. 
3. The defendant can beneficially use on said premises one-half of the flow 
of said Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 10 days. 
4. At the taking of water by defendant from said Spring Creek in the 
amounts he desires and at the time he desires creates a very difficult situation 
for [North Ditch] in attempting to regulate the water turns of its stockholders. 
(R. 57.) 
In addition to these findings of fact, Judge Nelson made the following 
conclusions of law: 
1. The defendant, Marvie Wall, is entitled to one-half of the flow of said 
Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 10 days. 
2. The defendant, Marvie Wall, should take his water in turns compatible 
with water turns of the stockholders of [North Ditch], defendant's first turn to 
commence in the afternoon of July 8, 1960. 
3. That with the entering of a decree based on these conclusions of law, 
the plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed. 
(R. 56.) 
On July 14, 1960, Judge Nelson entered the 1960 Judgment based upon these 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 55.) No appeal followed. 
B. Diligence Claim, 
Two days before Judge Nelson's July 8, 1960 hearing, Wall filed with the Utah 
state engineer's office a Statement of Water User's Claim to Diligence Rights ("Diligence 
Claim").1 (R. 15.) Wall's Diligence Claim purported to describe his right to divert from 
1
 A diligence claim is a water right established by diverting water from its natural channel 
and putting it to beneficial use since before 1903. See, e.g., Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 
P.2d 770, 771 n.l, 773, 773 n.8 (Utah 1991). 
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Spring Creek (i) 1.28 cubic feet per second during the period from April 1 to October 31 each 
year for irrigation purposes and (ii) .50 cubic feet per second for stock watering year-round. 
(R. 15.) 
C. Water User's Claim. 
On September 1, 1944, the Third District Court ordered the state engineer to 
determine and adjudicate all rights to the use of water of Utah Lake and the Jordan River in 
Utah County. (R. 2.) On June 21, 1972, the court ordered the state engineer to expand the 
general adjudication to include tributaries located in Wasatch County. (R. 2.) 
On February 25, 1982, plaintiff Ruby Wall Hicken filed with the state engineer 
a Statement of Water User's Claim No. 55-1403 ("Water User's Claim").2 (R. 4-5.) In the 
Water User's Claim, Ms. Hicken specifically referenced the 1960 Judgment (i.e., "Civil No. 
2348") and acknowledged that she was claiming a court "decreed right."3 (R. 5.) Ms. 
Hicken claimed only a "2/240 interest" in 3.0 cubic feet per second from Spring Creek for 
both irrigation and year-round stock watering. (R. 5.) 
The state engineer completed a Proposed Determination4 of numerous water 
user's claims asserting rights to use water from sources located in that portion of Wasatch 
County which drained into Main Creek, a tributary within the Utah Lake and Jordan River 
drainage. (R. 2.) The Proposed Determination covered water claims to use water from 
2
 To preserve water rights being adjudicated in a general adjudication, water users must 
file timely statements of water user's claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-5. 
3
 A decreed right is a water right established by a judgment entered by a court. 
4
 See Proposed Determination of Water Rights in Utah Lake & Jordan River Drainage 
Area, Provo River Division, Round Valley Subdivision, Code No. 55, Book No. 1 (hereinafter 
"Proposed Determination") (R. 1-3.) 
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Spring Creek, including Ms. Hicken's Water User's Claim and the water user's claims of 
North Ditch. (R. 1.) On May 1, 1984, the state engineer filed the Proposed Determination 
with the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The state engineer provided 
notice that all water claimants dissatisfied with the Proposed Determination must file written 
objections thereto within 90 days from the date of service of the Proposed Determination. (R. 
2.) The Hickens did not file an objection. 
D. Hickens' 1994 Lawsuit 
On August 31, 1994, the Hickens filed a verified complaint against North Ditch 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County claiming a right to divert 
continuously .50 cubic feet per second of water from the flow of Spring Creek for watering 
livestock. (R. 29, 19-20 fflf 8 and 10; 26-27.) The Hickens are the successors in interest to 
Marvie Wall, defendant in the 1960 Judgment. (R. 20.)5 
On June 13, 1995, the district court granted North Ditch's motion to dismiss 
and ruled that the Hickens' claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata as applied in 
Logan, Hvde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan City, 72 Utah 221, 269 P. 776 (1928). 
(R. 125.) The court reasoned as follows: 
'It is of no consequence whatever that the claims of [the plaintiff] for 
[livestock] purposes were not referred to in the pleadings or the judgment.' 
Logan [P.] at 778. The fact that the plaintiffs predecessor in interest already 
contemplated their alleged rights to the use of water in Spring Creek in 1960 
and received a Judgment on the merits is sufficient for this Court to sustain that 
Judgment. It is evident from the language of Judge Nelson's Judgment and 
Decree that the Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest was 'awarded one-half of the 
5
 Ruby Wall Hicken alleged that she is the successor in interest to Marvie Wall. (R. 20.) 
She alleged that she leased her water rights to her two sons, Thomas F. Hicken and John T. 
Hicken. (R. 20.) 
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flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours every ten days.' Such use 
could be for any purpose, including watering stock (or storing it for that 
purpose). Daily use was not allowed under Judge Nelson's Decree, said use 
thereby being precluded. 
(R. 123-24.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly dismissed the Hickens' verified complaint. The 
Hickens' claim to divert continuously from Spring Creek is barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata. Hickens' claim involves the same issue previously litigated and resolved by the 
1960 Judgment. The Hickens' predecessor, Marvie Wall, could have and should have claimed 
a right to divert continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock. The 1960 Judgment 
is a final decision on the merits that is subject to res judicata; it is not a "general adjudication" 
of water rights. 
The 1960 Judgment unambiguously prohibits the Hickens from diverting 
continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock. The term "turns" used in the 1960 
Judgment does not render the decision ambiguous and bars the Hickens' claim to a continuous 
diversion for watering livestock. The district court properly rejected the Hickens' assertions 
that they have diverted continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock since before 
1960 to the present. By their own admission, the Hickens have not diverted continuously 
from Spring Creek for stock watering since the 1960 Judgment. Moreover, the court correctly 
determined that the Hickens' livestock will not be threatened if the Hickens are precluded 
from diverting continuously for stock watering. 
Enforcing the 1960 Judgment to bar the Hickens' claimed right to divert 
continuously will preserve vital public interests permitting justified reliance on prior 
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judgments, preventing inconsistent decisions, relieving the parties of the cost and vexation of 
seemingly endless, multiple lawsuits over the same stream and the same claims, and 
preserving judicial resources. 
Finally, the Hickens' claim is barred for their failure to protest the Proposed 
Determination which awarded the Hickens a right to divert only intermittently from Spring 
Creek for a period of two hours every 240 hours (ten days). This determination reflected the 
Hickens' Water User's Claim which specifically referenced the 1960 Judgment and 
acknowledged the intermittent diversion for both irrigation and stock watering. The Hickens' 
failure to object bars their claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE 1960 JUDGMENT IS RES JUDICATA AS TO THE HICKENS' 
CLAIM FOR A CONTINUOUS DIVERSION AND BARS THEIR CLAIM 
Res judicata bars relitigation by the same parties or their privies of an issue that 
was litigated before and resolved in a final judgment on the merits. See Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme. Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 
1983); Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno. 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, 
claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata "also prevents the litigation of claims that 
could and should have been litigated in the prior action, but were not." Recovery Services. 
845 P.2d at 946 and cases cited therein (emphasis added). 
Without question the 1960 Judgment and the Hickens' 1994 lawsuit against 
North Ditch involve the same parties or their privies. Plaintiffs admit they are successors in 
interest to Marvie Wall, the defendant in the 1960 lawsuit brought by North Ditch. (R. 20.) 
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A. The Hickens' Claim is the Same Issue Resolved by the 1960 
Judgment 
The 1960 litigation and the present lawsuit involve the same issues (i.e., when 
and what quantity of water may the Hickens and their predecessor divert from Spring Creek?). 
As a result, this case is governed by Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan 
City, 72 Utah 221, 268 P. 776 (1928),6 where a prior water rights decree precluded Logan 
City from raising a claim to a particular water use different from that decreed. In 1922, the 
Logan district court entered a judgment and decree establishing the rights of various parties to 
use water from Logan River. Logan City claimed a right to divert water for culinary, 
domestic and municipal purposes but failed to assert any right to use such water for 
generating power. In a subsequent lawsuit, Logan City asserted a right to use Logan River 
water to generate power, a right not alleged in the 1922 pleadings and not mentioned in the 
1922 decree. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined from the record that the issue decided by 
the 1922 decree was the quantity of water that could be used by each claimant and the 
particular use to which such water could be placed. See id. at 227, 268 P. at 778. The legal 
effect of the 1922 decree was to "forever bar any of the other parties to the decree from 
asserting any adverse claim" to the water quantity or water use established by the decree. Id, 
268 P. at 778. Therefore, the Court reasoned that Logan City was precluded from asserting a 
6
 The Hickens imply that Logan should be ignored because its legal strength has 
somehow weakened with age; however, they cite to no "younger" authority overruling or even 
questioning Logan's solid, time-proven holding and rationale. The maturity of that decision, 
along with numerous other Utah water rights decisions, demonstrates the strength of the 
precedent. 
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right to use water that was not specified in the decree; otherwise, the decree would be a 
"futile proceeding." Id at 228, 268 P. at 778. Moreover, the Logan court stated that 
it is of no consequence whatever that the claims of Logan City for power 
purposes were not referred to in the pleadings or the judgment. The action 
itself was a challenge to Logan City to assert any claim it had, of any nature or 
kind, which was adverse to or inconsistent with the rights claimed in the 
pleadings. 
Id at 227-28, 268 P. at 778 (emphasis added). 
Like the claim in Logan, the Hickens' claim to divert continuously from Spring 
Creek was resolved by the 1960 Judgment. Wall was diverting water any time and in any 
amount he wanted. These diversions disrupted North Ditch's water distribution to its 
stockholders. As in the first determination in Logan, here Judge Nelson in 1960 determined 
from Wall's evidence of water use (i) the maximum quantity of water Wall could divert; and 
(ii) how often Wall needed to divert from Spring Creek. 
(R. 56-57.) Both conclusions hinged on how Wall had used Spring Creek water. Judge 
Nelson ruled that the Hickens' predecessor could divert only one-half of the flow of Spring 
Creek for a period of two hours every ten days. (R. 56-57.) This resolution restored order by 
establishing the maximum quantity of water that each party could divert and schedule of 
diversions from Spring Creek. (R. 56-57.) 
The legal effect of the 1960 Decree forever bars the Hickens' claim to a 
diversion other than for one-half the flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours every ten 
days. Any other result would render the 1960 Judgment futile and a nullity. As in Logan, 
the res judicata bar applies even though neither the pleadings nor the 1960 Judgment 
expressly referenced a claim to divert continuously for "watering livestock." Under Logan, 
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which applies as much now as in 1960, Wall was required in the 1960 litigation to assert any 
right to divert continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock or any other use. See 
Logan, 72 Utah at 227-28, 268 P. at 778. The Hickens' claim is barred because they are 
raising an issue that the 1960 Judgment resolved. 
B. The Hickens' Predecessor Could Have and Should Have Claimed a 
Right to Divert Continuously for Watering Livestock. 
To the extent the Hickens assert that their claim was not already litigated, their 
claim is barred by claim preclusion. Wall could and should have claimed a right to divert 
continuously for watering stock. The Hickens argue that the 1960 Judgment determined only 
Wall's right to divert water from Spring Creek for irrigating his property. (Hickens' Brief at 
10.) They suggest that the 1960 Judgment did not determine a claim to divert continuously 
from Spring Creek for watering livestock. However, not only would this theory prevent final 
resolution of anyone's rights (water users in years to come could raise new uses not expressly 
mentioned before), but the Hickens' claim to divert continuously is barred because their 
predecessor could and should have raised it in 1960. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1981), that claim preclusion 
is equally applicable to a defense which might have been but was not asserted 
in connection with an earlier proceeding (which terminated in a final judgment) 
in what is essentially a single and continuing controversy over the appropriate 
relief to give for a single wrong or a closely related group of wrongs. 
Id at 531. 
The Supreme Court has applied this principle to bar an irrigation company's 
effort to change a prior water rights decree in Warren Irrigation Co. v. Brown, 28 Utah 2d 
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103, 498 P.2d 667 (1972). There, the irrigation company sought to decrease the quantity of 
water awarded to the defendants' predecessors in a 1914 decree. The defendants' rights were 
defined in a stipulation between the irrigation company and the defendants' predecessors. The 
stipulation was incorporated into the 1914 decree. In 1972, the irrigation company filed a 
lawsuit claiming defendants were entitled to less water than what was decreed in 1914 
because of the legal effect of a 1903 deed. The irrigation company challenged the 1914 
decree and a subsequent 1938 decree affirming the 1914 decree. The trial court applied 
principles of claim preclusion and 
found that the rights and obligations of the parties had been determined by the 
[1914 and 1938] decrees, and the matter was now res judicata. The court 
observed that after living with these decrees for nearly 50 years, plaintiff was 
not in a position to raise issues, which were or could have been previously 
settled. 
Id. at 106, 498 P.2d at 669 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. 
See id. at 107, 498 P.2d at 670. 
The Hickens' claim to divert continuously from Spring Creek is no different. 
After living with the 1960 Judgment for 35 years, the Hickens cannot raise their claim now; it 
could have or should have been litigated in 1960. Wall claimed that he could divert from 
Spring Creek any quantity of water, any time he wanted, and thereby disrupted North Ditch's 
distribution of water for its shareholders. Obviously Wall's boundless claim would have 
included continuous diversions for watering livestock, if he had such a right. To preserve his 
rights, Wall was forced to present evidence of his diversions and use of Spring Creek water. 
(R. 56-57.) From the evidence and stipulation of the parties, Wall was found to have a right 
to divert one-half of the flow of Spring Creek for two hours every ten days. 
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The Hickens base their claim for a continuous diversion on the Diligence Claim 
filed with the state engineer's office two days prior to the 1960 hearing. The Hickens' 
reliance on this Diligence Claim is analogous to the 1903 deed raised in Warren Irrigation. 
Like the irrigation company's untimely 1903-deed argument, the Hickens' predecessor knew 
of the Diligence Claim before the 1960 hearing and thus, could have and should have raised it 
there. The Diligence Claim, also like the 1903-deed, conclusively demonstrates that if Wall 
had such a right,7 he could have raised the claim to divert continuously from Spring Creek. 
Undoubtedly, if he had such right, Wall should have claimed it for stock watering. Because 
Wall raised no such "right," the Hickens are precluded from claiming one at this late date. 
C. The 1960 Judgment is a Final Decision On the Merits. 
The 1960 Judgment is res judicata as to the Hickens' claim because it is a final 
decision on the merits. The Hickens' attempt to evade res judicata by incorrectly casting the 
1960 Judgment as just a "general adjudication" of water rights by the state engineer which 
would not bar a subsequent action. (Hickens' Brief at 11-16.) A general adjudication of 
water rights is a special proceeding conducted primarily by the state engineer pursuant to Utah 
statutes. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (addendum to Hickens' 
Brief); see also Provo River Water User's Ass'n v. Morgan. 857 P.2d 927, 929 & n.l (Utah 
1993).8 The Hickens cite authorities interpreting general adjudication decrees that do not 
7
 The affidavits attached as support for the Hickens' Diligence Claim never mention 
water being used for stock watering. (R. 4-11.) 
8
 A general adjudication is commenced under the following conditions. The state 
engineer initiates a general adjudication after (i) a qualified number of water users file a 
petition; and (ii) an investigation demonstrates a water rights determination is justified. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1. A water user may initiate a general adjudication if (i) the 
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apply here. See, e.g., Provo River, 857 P.2d at 928-35 (interpreting general adjudication 
decree); Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 409 P.2d 616 
(1965) (same). 
In Orderville, the Supreme Court observed that for purposes of res judicata "it 
is important to keep in mind that we are not here concerned with the usual type of judgment." 
17 Utah 2d at 285, 409 P.2d at 619. The Court held that rule of res judicata does not prevent 
actions over disputed general adjudication decrees. See id., 409 P.2d at 619. However, this 
rule does not apply to judgments that are not general adjudications of water rights. See 
Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan City, 72 Utah 221, 268 P. 776 (1928) 
(applying res judicata to water rights decree that was not a general adjudication); Warren 
Irrigation Co. v. Brown, 28 Utah 2d 103, 498 P.2d 667 (1972) (same). 
The 1960 Judgment is a usual type of judgment that is subject to the principles 
of res judicata. See, e.g.. Little v. Greene & Weed Inv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1992) 
(recognizing that "[pjrivate suits . . . may be brought to adjudicate water rights") and cases 
cited therein. The 1960 Judgment is not a general adjudication, and therefore, the principles 
applied in the Orderville and Provo River decisions do not apply here. North Ditch did not 
file its 1960 lawsuit, and the same was not conducted, as a general adjudication under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -24. Rather, a single irrigation company, North Ditch, sued an 
individual water user, Mr. Wall. Further, the 1960 lawsuit did not involve a major part of 
determination involves the "major part of the water" of a "river system, lake, underground 
basin, or other natural source of supply" or (ii) the rights of ten or more claimants to water 
from such source. Id § 73-4-3. In any lawsuit involving a water rights dispute, district 
courts have discretion to order the state engineer to investigate and survey all rights to the 
water source involved. See id. § 73-4-1. 
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any water source but a small stream, Spring Creek, in Wallsburg, Utah. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-4-3. The then pending general adjudication covered Utah County not Spring Creek or 
any other water source in Wasatch County. (R. 2.) The pending general adjudication was not 
expanded to include Spring Creek until 1972, twelve (12) years after the 1960 Judgment. (R. 
2.) The 1960 Judgment was completely unrelated to and separate from the pending general 
adjudication.9 
D. The 1960 Judgment Unambiguously Prohibits the Hickens From 
Diverting Continuously. 
Regardless of the use to which the Hickens put Spring Creek water, the 1960 
Judgment unambiguously restricts their diversions to one-half the flow for a period of two 
hours every ten days. The Hickens suggest that the 1960 Judgment covered only their 
"irrigation rights" and not their right to divert continuously from Spring Creek for stock 
watering. In so characterizing the 1960 Judgment, the Hickens ignore and unfortunately 
distort Judge Nelson's 1960 findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Judge Nelson found that North Ditch had appropriated two-thirds of the flow of 
Spring Creek. (R. 57.) Judge Nelson found that Wall and his predecessors "since before 
1900" used Spring Creek water "in the amounts they thought necessary and at the times they 
desired to irrigate lawn, garden and pasture." (R. 57 (emphasis added).) North Ditch was 
challenging Wall's right to divert unlimited quantities of water whenever he wanted from 
Spring Creek, not just the quantities he used for irrigation. (R. 56-57, 59.) These findings 
9
 The Hickens incorrectly state that the 1960 Judgment was entered during the pendency 
of a general adjudication. (Hickens' Brief, at 17-18) In 1960, no pending general 
adjudication included Spring Creek; as such, Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co., 1 
Utah 2d 313, 265 P.2d 1016 (1954) does not apply here. 
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demonstrate that Judge Nelson determined from evidence of Wall's water use the quantity of 
water that Wall could divert from Spring Creek for all of his uses. 
Further, Judge Nelson found that Wall could "beneficially use" on his property 
"one-half of the flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 10 days." (R. 57.) 
This finding is critical because beneficial use is the "basis, the measure and the limit of all 
rights to the use of water in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3. Judge Nelson found that 
Wall had no right to divert any quantity he wanted but was limited to the quantity of water 
that he and predecessors had put to beneficial use on his property. (R. 56-57) Based on 
Wall's evidence of his beneficial use, Judge Nelson found that the measure and limit which 
Wall could divert was solely one-half the flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours 
every ten days. (R. 56-57.) This measure and limit applies to any use whether for stock 
watering or irrigation. 
Judge Nelson also found that Wall's diversions of Spring Creek water "in the 
amounts he desires and at the time he desires creates a very difficult situation for [North 
Ditch] in attempting to regulate the water turns of its stockholders." (R. 57.) This finding 
also demonstrates that the 1960 litigation did not exclude Wall's right, if any, to divert 
continuously for stock watering. When Wall could divert was a critical issue in the 1960 
litigation because Wall was disrupting North Ditch's distribution of Spring Creek water to its 
shareholders. To restore and maintain harmony, Judge Nelson ordered Wall to "take his water 
in turns compatible with the water turns of the stockholders of North Ditch." (R. 56.) Judge 
Nelson also determined that Wall's "first turn" would "commence in the afternoon of July 8, 
1960." (R. 56.) Obviously, if Wall had a right to divert continuously for stock watering, 
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Judge Nelson would have had to provide for the same in the 1960 Judgment. Because Wall 
was not granted a right to divert continuously for stock watering, the Hickens' claim is 
barred. 
1. The Term "Turns" Bars Continuous Diversions for Stock Watering 
The 1960 Judgment should be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary and 
usual meaning of the words used." Plain City Irr. Co. v. Hooper Irr. Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 
191, 356 P.2d 625, 627 (I960).10 By using the term "turns," Judge Nelson did not limit the 
1960 Judgment to irrigation use. "Turns" inherently precludes a continuous diversion from 
Spring Creek for any use. The ordinary or usual meaning of "turn" is an "opportunity" 
afforded in "simple succession or in a scheduled order." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 1273 (1987). Judge Nelson ordered Wall to divert only during his turns to restore 
harmony between the parties by imposing a scheduled order of diversions from Spring Creek. 
The 1960 Judgment ensured that harmony would be maintained by ordering Wall to divert 
only for two hours every ten days, Wall's turn. Continuous diversions would be contrary to 
this or any diversion schedule. The plain and usual meaning of "turns" requires the Hickens 
and North Ditch shareholders to divert water "in a scheduled order" just as people must take 
turns being examined by the same physician. 
0
 The "plain language rule" simply requires that documents be construed and applied 
according to their plain language. See CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 897 
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995), cert, denied. 116 S. Ct. 699 (1996); Archer v. Board of State 
Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995); however, the document must be read in 
its entirety, Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982), so as 
to harmonize all of its provisions, and all of its provisions must be given effect. See Larrabee 
v. Royal Dairy Products Co.. 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980); Jones v. Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 
1980). 
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The Hickens claim "the term 'turns' is generally used only when referring to 
irrigation water distribution." (Hickens' Brief at 11.) Not only is this not the plain and usual 
meaning, the decisions the Hickens cite do not support this generalization. One of those 
decisions confirms that water rights decrees have required users to divert water intermittently 
on "turns" for both irrigation and stock watering use. The decision cited by the Hickens, 
Lasson v. Seelv, 120 Utah 679, 238 P.2d 418 (1951), and a related case, McKean v. Lasson, 
5 Utah 2d 168, 298 P.2d 827 (1956), both address a general adjudication called the Smith 
Decree. The Smith Decree established rights to divert water intermittently on turns from a 
stream. See McKean, 5 Utah 2d at 170, 298 P.2d at 828; Sedy, 120 Utah at 682, 238 P.2d at 
420. However, the parties had to use or store the diverted water during each of their 
intermittent turns for both irrigation and stock watering. McKean, 5 Utah 2d at 172, 298 P.2d 
at 830.u The Smith Decree did not grant any user a right to divert continuously from the 
stream for stock watering, contrary to what the Hickens imply.12 
2. The District Court Correctly Disregarded the Hickens' Assertions of 
Continuous Diversions Since 1960 
The district court did not err in disregarding the Hickens' assertion that they 
have diverted continuously from Spring Creek for watering stock since before 1960. Once the 
11
 The water users constructed watertight dams to store water for irrigation and stock 
watering during the drier season. McKean, 5 Utah 2d at 172, 298 P.2d at 830; see also Seely, 
120 Utah at 688, 238 P.2d at 422 (recognizing that water users can store diverted water in 
reservoir for further use). 
12
 The decision in Bigler v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434 (Utah 1983) 
does not state whether the shareholders of the irrigation company had rights for stock 
watering. However, if they did, they did not have rights to continuously divert because they 
were limited to divert intermittently on a turn every ten days to three weeks. 
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1960 Judgment was entered, the Hickens and their predecessors were prohibited from 
diverting continuously from Spring Creek. Any continuous diversion after July 8, 1960 would 
have been and remains a violation of the 1960 Judgment. (R. 56.) Assuming the Hickens 
and their predecessor have diverted continuously since July 8, 1960, they would have been 
doing so unlawfully and causing exactly what led to the 1960 litigation, i.e., the disruption of 
North Ditch's distribution of water to its shareholders. 
However, by their own admission, the Hickens have not diverted continuously 
from Spring Creek for stock watering since the 1960 Judgment. Under their Water User's 
Claim, they claim only a "2/240" interest in the flow of Spring Creek for both irrigation and 
stock watering. Moreover, they specifically acknowledge that they have a decreed right based 
on the 1960 Judgment. (R. 5.) The 2/240 interest is simply another way of saying two hours 
every 240 hours (or ten days) when read in conjunction with the 1960 Judgment. The 
Hickens, therefore, admit that they did not have a right to divert continuously for stock 
watering.13 
Finally, the 1960 Judgment unequivocally prohibits continuous diversions from 
Spring Creek to ensure an orderly distribution of water for the benefit of all users.14 The 
13
 If the Hickens have diverted Spring Creek continuously contrary to their Water User's 
Claim and the 1960 Judgment, they would have unclean hands by having made a sworn false 
statement in their Water User's Claim. 
14
 The Record demonstrates that North Ditch did not acquiesce or otherwise agree to 
allow the Hickens to divert continuously from Spring Creek in contravention of the 1960 
Judgment. The exact opposite is alleged. North Ditch ignored the Hickens' claim to divert 
continuously. (R. 31.) North Ditch has "repeatedly removed" the Hickens' "diversion 
structure." (R. 30.) North Ditch denied the Hickens' claim to continuously divert. (R. 30.) 
North Ditch would not respect the Hickens' right to continuously divert from Spring Creek. 
(R. 26.) Finally, North Ditch "interfered with" the Hickens' continuous diversions from 
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Hickens' assertions conclusively demonstrate why their claim should be precluded under the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
3. The Hickens5 Livestock are not Threatened if the Hickens are 
Precluded From Diverting Continuously 
The Hickens imply that their cattle will die without a continuous diversion 
from Spring Creek for stock watering. (Hickens' Brief at 11.) This alarming suggestion is 
exaggerated and misleading. The District Court correctly observed that the Hickens' use of 
the intermittently diverted water "could be for any purpose, including watering stock (or 
storing it for that purpose). Daily use was not allowed under Judge Nelson's Decree, said use 
thereby being precluded." (R. 123; see also Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 688, 238 P.2d 
418, 422 (1951) (recognizing that water users can store water in reservoir for further use).) 
Moreover, the Hickens admit they have a source other than Spring Creek from which they 
continuously divert for watering livestock. (R. 81; see also R. 11-12 (describing the Hickens' 
water rights in ditch known as Bull River, Mill Race and Back Ditch.) Accordingly, even if 
the health of the livestock could alter the 1960 Judgment (and it cannot), the 1960 Judgment 
is not inequitable or harsh. 
E. Barring the Hickens' Claim for a Continuous Diversion will 
Preserve Vital Public Interests. 
The doctrine of res judicata preserves "vital public interests" including "(1) 
fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving 
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; and (4) preserving judicial resources." 
Spring Creek. (R. 19.) 
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Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and cases 
cited therein. 
For over 36 years North Ditch has relied on the 1960 Judgment which it 
correctly believed forever established the diversion schedule for Spring Creek water. The 
state engineer also relied on the 1960 Judgment and specifically incorporated the diversion 
schedule into the Proposed Determination. (R. 1.) The Proposed Determination restricted the 
Hickens to an intermittent diversion of two hours every 240 hours (i.e., ten days) for both 
irrigation and stock watering. (R. 1.) The Hickens also manifested their reliance on the 1960 
Judgment by specifically referencing the same and claiming only a right to divert 
intermittently for both irrigation and stock watering two hours every 240 hours (or ten days). 
(R. 5.) To permit the Hickens' claim would undermine all reliance on any judgment that 
restricts water users to a maximum quantity of water and an intermittent diversion schedule. 
Any party to such a judgment could contrive other water uses not "expressly" referenced in 
prior judgments in an endless flow of litigation that would preclude any assurance that water 
users will receive their decreed allotment. 
Barring the Hickens' claim advances the other policies underlying principles of 
res judicata. Inconsistent decisions will be prevented. North Ditch and the Hickens will be 
relieved of the significant cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits involving the same stream, 
the same parties and the same claims. Moreover, judicial resources will be preserved by not 
rehashing the Hickens' claim and those of their successors, all of which were or could have 
been resolved in 1960. 
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II. THE HICKENS' CLAIM IS BARRED FOR THEIR FAILURE TO 
OBJECT TO THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION 
The Hickens' claim to a continuous diversion for watering livestock also is 
barred because they failed to object to the Proposed Determination submitted to the Third 
District Court by the state engineer in 1984. After receiving notice of a proposed 
determination, a water claimant has 90 days from the date of mailing of such notice to file a 
written objection. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12. Failure to object timely bars any 
subsequent claim. See Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 291-92 (Utah 1992); In re Escalante 
Valley Drainage Area. 12 Utah 2d 112, 113, 363 P.2d 777, 778 (1961); Green River 
Adjudication v. United States. 17 Utah 2d 50, 52, 404 P.2d 251, 252 (1965) (to avoid 
piecemeal litigation and provide "finality and solidarity," untimely objections are barred). 
Water users who do not object to a proposed determination must "be bound by the result for 
the same sound reasons that justify the doctrine of res judicata." Id at 52, 404 P.2d at 252. 
The Proposed Determination restricts the Hickens to divert intermittently water 
from Spring Creek for stock watering. The Proposed Determination is based on the Hickens' 
Water User's Claim (R. 4-5.) and the 1960 Judgment. The Proposed Determination 
specifically references and incorporates the 1960 Judgment by limiting the Hickens' stock 
watering to the diversion schedule ordered by Judge Nelson. The Proposed Determination 
provides that the Hickens' Water User's Claim is a "court decreed right under civil case 2348" 
(i.e., Judge Nelson's 1960 Judgment). (R. 1, 57; see also Hickens' Water User's Claim 
(R. 5.). 
As claimed by the Hickens in their Water User's Claim, the Proposed 
Determination restricts their claim to a "2/240 interest" in a water flow of 3.0 cubic feet per 
23 
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second. (R. 1.) The Proposed Determination also clarifies that the flow of Spring Creek "is 
intermittently diverted" pursuant to the Hickens' Water User's Claim and North Ditch's water 
user's claim number 55-4456 ("WUC 55-4456"). (R. 1. (emphasis added).) Moreover, the 
Proposed Determination awards North Ditch, in part, a corresponding "238/240 interest" in the 
3.0 cubic feet per second flow from Spring Creek "intermittently diverted" by the Hickens. 
(R. 1, WUC 55-4456 (emphasis added).) The plain meaning of the term "intermittently" is 
not continuously.15 The Proposed Determination specifically limits the Hickens to 
"intermittently" divert from Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 240 hours (i.e., ten 
days) for both irrigation and stock watering.16 Hence, the Hickens' year-round stock 
watering right is expressly restricted to an intermittent not continuous diversion from Spring 
Creek. 
Had they wished to object to the plain limitations of the Proposed 
Determination, the Hickens should have filed a written objection. The Proposed 
Determination squarely contradicts the Hickens' claim to a continuous diversion for stock 
watering. The Hickens, however, could not object because the Proposed Determination 
reflects their Water User's Claim to an intermittent diversion for stock watering based on the 
1960 Judgment. Because the Hickens failed to object, their claim is barred. 
15
 See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 632 (1987) (intermittent means 
"coming and going at intervals: not continuous" (emphasis added)). 
16
 The Proposed Determination provides that the Hickens' Water User's Claim "is limited 
to 2/240 interest in [3.0 cfs] which is intermittently diverted by" the Hickens' Water User's 
Claim and North Ditch's water user's claim no. 55-4456. (R. 1.) When read in conjunction 
with the 1960 Judgment, "2/240" clearly means two hours every 240 hours (240 hours in ten 
days). This interpretation is supported by Ruby Wall Hickens' admission as set forth in the 
Hicken's Water User's Claim. (R. 4-5.) 
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Ironically, the Hickens argue that North Ditch is bound by the Proposed 
Determination because it awards the Hickens a year-round stock watering right, and North 
Ditch failed to file a written objection. (Hickens' Brief at 16-18.) However, North Ditch 
does not dispute that the Hickens may have a right to use Spring Creek for watering stock 
year-round, as long as the diversion is intermittent as scheduled (not continuous). North 
Ditch did not need to file an objection because the Proposed Determination incorporates the 
1960 Judgment by limiting the Hickens to an intermittent diversion from Spring Creek for all 
water uses two hours every 240 hours (ten days). In sum, the district court did not err in 
disregarding the Proposed Determination in dismissing the Hickens' complaint under the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court for 
Wasatch County dismissing the verified complaint should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of September, 1996. 
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